

Message Text

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27 FEB 1976 QUOTE

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TAGS: PFOR, IS, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DINITZ, FEBRUARY 25, 1976

SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY MET WITH AMBASSADOR DINITZ FOR AN
HOUR ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1976, AT DINITZ' REQUEST.

DINITZ CONVEYED THE GOI'S DECISION TO AUTHORIZE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN ON ENDING
THE STATE OF WAR, AND ALSO RAISED SOME BILATERAL ITEMS.
END SUMMARY.

1. DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS: DINITZ SAID THE PRIME
MINISTER HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO INFORM THE SECRETARY OF
THE CABINET'S DECISION OF FEBRUARY 22 AUTHORIZING THE
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PRIME MINISTER TO PROPOSE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, ON ENDING THE STATE OF WAR. SECONDLY, THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE EXACT MEANING OF AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR WOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES AND HE ASSUMED IT WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF CLARIFICATION BETWEEN US BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATION COMMENCED. THEREFORE THE PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTED EITHER THAT THE LEGAL ADVISERS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COME TO WASHINGTON TO WORK WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THIS, OR THAT ISRAEL PRESENT TO THE SECRETARY ITS CONCEPT OF AN END TO THE

STATE OF WAR AND GET OUR COMMENTS ON IT. DINITZ SAID HE THOUGHT RABIN PREFERRED THE LATTER COURSE, BECAUSE IT WAS LESS DRAMATIC AND WOULD POSE LESS DANGER OF LEAKS. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AUTHORIZED DINITZ TO OFFER BOTH IDEAS.

2. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD ALREADY READ ALL OF THIS IN THE ISRAELI PRESS, AND THE ARABS HAD NOW READ IT TOO. THE APPROACH WHICH HE AND RABIN HAD AGREED UPON DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IN JANUARY HAD ASSUMED THAT (1) WE WOULD NOT PRESS ISRAEL, (2) ISRAEL WOULD COME UP WITH THIS NEGOTIATING IDEA, AND (3) THE USG WOULD THEN APPROACH SADAT QUIETLY THROUGH EILTS TO SOUND HIM OUT, SO THAT SADAT COULD TAKE CREDIT FOR IT AMONG THE ARABS. THE LEAK NOW MEANT THAT WE HAD NOTHING TO PRESENT TO SADAT THAT HE HADN'T ALREADY READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS, AND THERE WAS A DANGER ALL THE ARABS WOULD REJECT IT BEFORE WE HAD ANY CHANCE TO CONVEY IT.

3. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL HAD LIVED UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS, WITH THE UNFORTUNATE OCCURRENCE THAT THE CABINET DECISION LEAKED. THE PRIME MINISTER FELT HE NEEDED AUTHORITY FROM THE CABINET TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL. THE DECISION AS ANNOUNCED WAS NOT EXACTLY HAILED IN ISRAEL.

4. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT RABIN HAD CARRIED OUT WHAT HE SAID--ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY HAD NOT EXPECTED IT WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO AN EXTENDED NEGOTIATION AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF
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NONBELLIGERENCY. THE TIME FOR THIS WOULD COME WHEN THE ARABS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE AN ISRAELI PAPER ON THE SUBJECT HOWEVER. IN ANY CASE, THE USG WOULD PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN TO CALL HERMANN EILTS BACK FOR CONSULTATION--WHICH WOULD BE FEBRUARY 29. THE LEAK MADE IT MORE IMPERATIVE TO APPROACH SADAT QUICKLY WITH THIS OFFER. WE WOULD CONVEY THE ISRAELI IDEA OF

TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR AN END TO A STATE OF WAR, WITHOUT ANY DEFINITION OF THE CONTENT OF EITHER CONCEPT.

7. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HERMANN EILTS WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON THE 29TH, AND HE WOULD SUGGEST TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE GOI SEND A PAPER THROUGH HIM OUTLINING ITS CONCEPT OF AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR.

8. BILATERAL ISSUES: DINITZ THEN RAISED SOME BILATERAL ISSUES, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH SCOWCROFT.

9. FIRST WAS THE ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR THE TRANSITIONAL QUARTER. DINITZ SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD WORK NOW IN THE SENATE TO SEEK AN APPROPRIATION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT HE PERSONALLY FELT THE SEPTEMBER MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT OBLIGATED THE USG TO OBTAIN A FULL YEAR'S FUNDING.

10. DINITZ THEN MENTIONED TANKS. THE PENTAGON WAS WILLING TO DELIVER 125 M-48A-5'S BEGINNING AS EARLY AS AUGUST 1977, OR 125 M-60'S BEGINNING IN MAY 1978. DINITZ SUGGESTED THAT SINCE WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE THREE-YEAR PROGRAM, ISRAEL WOULD REQUEST BOTH OF THESE AND TREAT THEM AS PART OF THE 430 TANKS THAT IT SOUGHT OVER THE THREE-YEAR PERIOD. SCOWCROFT HAD TOLD DINITZ THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE PENTAGON HAD COMMITTED THEM ELSEWHERE. DINITZ WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY HIS GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTION TO OUR SELLING THESE SAME TANKS TO SAUDI ARABIA, A COUNTRY WITH WHICH ISRAEL WAS IN A STATE OF WAR AND WHICH HAD TRANSFERRED ARMS TO THE CONFRONTATION STATES. THIS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA ALSO DELAYED THE M-60'S FOR ISRAEL.

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11. DINITZ ALSO MENTIONED THAT ISRAEL NOW WAS ADDING TO ITS REQUEST LIST 94 155-MILLIMETER SELF-PROPELLED GUNS, WHICH THE PENTAGON HAD EARLIER THOUGHT WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

12. FINALLY, DINITZ SAID THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PICKED UP A REPORT THAT WE WERE SELLING EGYPT ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR WARNING STATION IN THE SINAI. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS TO THIS REPORT. INGERSOLL UNQTE INGERSOLL

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